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The European Union in Global Environmental Governance:  
Leadership in the Making? 
 
John Vogler & Hannes R. Stephan 
 
Introduction 
 
At the heart of European policy for sustainable development and global environmental 
governance (GEG) lies a vision quite different from that traditionally pursued by sovereign 
nation-states.  Appealing to multilateralism and sustainability, the vision has been self-
consciously promoted as part of the emergent identity of the Union.
1
 The European Union 
pursues an ideal of collective action and actively advances its own model of regional 
integration. While powerful players like the United States (see Chasek, this volume) or 
emerging giants like China are opposed to many aspects of international regulation, the EU 
generally sees its own vision as being in tune with the ethos of the United Nations system 
itself, despite the fact that it labours under a number of disadvantages in New York, not the 
least of which is the inferior status of the European Community in an organisation exclusively 
composed of sovereign states.  
Outsiders may well be sceptical, for the Union is no stranger to an aggressive pursuit of trade, 
agricultural or fisheries interests. Yet there is no necessary contradiction between the 
promotion of European values, the pursuit of interests and the strong support for a more 
ambitious agenda of global regulation.  
 
 In 2003, a communication from the European Commission reaffirmed Europe's 
commitment to a multilateral system governed through the United Nations and 
simultaneously highlighted ways of enhancing the EU's influence. With an implicit attempt to 
establish a contrasting identity to that of the United States, the EU and the UN were portrayed 
as holding the fate of the world in their hands: 
 
"In the years ahead, therefore, Europe’s attachment to multilateralism – and to the 
United Nations, as the pivot of the multilateral system – will help determine 
whether, and how, the institutional architecture established in the years after 
World War II can continue to serve as the bedrock of the international system. 
                                                 
1
 Reference to the debates on European identity and the extent to which it may merely be the reciprocal of 
military weakness, Kagan (2003), Rifkin,(2004) Bretherton and Vogler (2006) Ch.2. 
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The alternative would be devastating – not only in its implications for 
international peace and security, but also for the wider multilateral agenda, 
ranging from the follow-up to recent international conferences to the development 
of a rule-based international trading system" (European Commission 2003: 3). 
 
The institutional architecture would also include the setting up of the International 
Criminal Court and the development of the European Security and Defence Policy as a 
‘crisis management’ capability at the service of the UN, but the focus of this article is 
the question of global environmental governance (GEG). Although this has been 
variously defined – and can be drawn extremely broadly – it is normally seen by the 
policy community to involve efforts to reform and reintegrate those activities and 
organisations bearing upon questions of environmental degradation and sustainable 
development, that come under the very broad umbrella of the United Nations.  Thus we 
might include the various environmental conventions and their autonomous 
Conferences of the parties, the WTO, the IMF and IBRD, and numerous other 
development-related organisations. At the heart of the shifting discussion of sustainable 
development has been the Rio process, initiated by UNCED in 1992 and followed up by 
the meetings of its creation, the Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD). 
Organisationally the key body, set up by the predecessor to UNCED – the Stockholm 
Conference of 1972 – has been the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).  
As a programme, and hence lacking the independence of a specialised agency, UNEP 
has performed a ‘catalytic and co-ordinating’ role across a wide range of international 
environmental activities. The formal debate upon global governance has often 
converged upon its role and status as well as the linked issue of the creation of an 
overarching World Environment Organisation (WEO).      
 
In all major global environmental fora, the EU has been one of the few actors to 
consistently argue in favour of institutional reforms and the speedy and accountable 
implementation of existing commitments. At times, it has even suggested equipping 
international institutions with legal powers of compliance monitoring (see ENB 2002: 4) – a 
proposition that has echoes of the internal role of the European Commission, which regularly 
holds national governments to account.  However, there remains a "disturbing mismatch 
between aspirations and demands of the EU as an international actor and its relatively limited 
ability to deliver" (Chaban et al. 2006: 246). This involves the intractability of the subject 
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matter as well as the internal and institutional problems associated with an actor comprised of 
27 sovereign states. 
 
The core arenas of global governance have all built their sometimes fragile legitimacy 
on a forthright commitment to development. The concept of sustainable development which – 
despite its many ambivalent definitions – has provided the theoretical bridge connecting the 
environment with economy and society has proved a congenial one for the EU with its well-
developed external aid and environmental policies.  Environmental matters received no 
mention in the Treaty of Rome, but since the 1970s an impressive array of internal legislation 
has been developed to cope with the environmental effects of the success of economic 
integration in Europe. At the same time the Union remains, alongside the United States, a 
dominant player in the politics of international trade and agriculture as well as possessing a 
very substantial distant water fishing fleet operating under the Common Fisheries Policy. 
When the aid programmes of the European Community and the Member States are taken 
together, the Union constitutes the largest development donor on earth with a special 
responsibility for the 77 African Caribbean and Pacific countries.  Sustainable development is 
now an objective of the Union (TEU Art.2) and environmental protection requirements are to 
be integrated into the definition and implementation of European Community’s other policies 
and activities (TEC Art.6)
1
. 
 
   For now, the priorities of sustainable development remain "far from being at the 
centre of decision-making in the multilateral system" (Swedish EU Discussion Paper 2001: 2) 
and, arguably, the prevalent interpretation of sustainable development is substantially tilted 
towards conventional economic aspects, in particular poverty eradication and economic 
growth (Von Frantzius 2004). This situation has been mirrored by some of the internal 
difficulties and contradictions experienced by the Union and must bear upon its external 
legitimacy as a leader. There is a record of incoherence between environmental and trade and 
agricultural policies and although the Union has at least placed environmental considerations 
on the WTO agenda they have hardly been at the forefront of the objectives of DG Trade and 
DG Agriculture. In essence, the shifting global agenda has meant that environmental issues 
have less and less been the subject of separate, sectoral discussions and have instead begun to 
be integrated with other aspects of global governance, particularly with the global movement 
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 The TEU, Treaty on European Union was agreed at Maastricht in 1992, while the incorporation of sustainable 
development as a Community objective was achieved by the revision of the TEC, treaty establishing the 
European Community at Amsterdam in 1997.  
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for development.
1
 As this article will show, the European reaction to this trend has essentially 
comprised two strategic responses: the EU has, on the one hand, wholeheartedly embraced the 
ideal of sustainable development and sought to promote it vigorously. At the same time, it has 
explored ways of strengthening the more focused sector of international environmental 
governance (IEG) to preserve an autonomous voice for the environment. Though these 
responses may at first glance appear contradictory, they are better described as 
complementary. Moreover, the results obtained so far are indicative of the moderate yet 
measurable impact of European positions in world politics. An analysis of the EU role and 
positions in the Rio process, at the CSD, and on the question of UNEP reform constitutes the 
main content of this article, but they must be prefaced by a consideration of  the frequent but 
problematic assumption that the Union is an actor comparable, say, to the United States.  
 
The EU as an actor in global environmental governance 
 
The extent to which the EU may be regarded as an international actor in its own right, 
comprised as it is of the European Community and 27 Member States, continues to pose 
problems. 
2
 Although it has developed extensive rights of participation in the negotiation of 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) it has encountered particular difficulties with 
recognition at the UN General Assembly, within UNEP, at the ‘Rio plus’ conferences and 
within the CSD.  Alongside the complex internal structures of EU policy-making, the 
different ways in which the Union represents itself externally prompt questions about ‘who 
speaks for the Union’, the extent to which  the Union has developed a coherent line on the 
reform of international environmental governance and the degree to which the EU is 
comparable to the other actors considered in this volume.         
 
 For the Member States, the great majority of environmental legislation now originates 
in the form of directives of the European Community. The latter has developed policy 
competencies, replacing those of the Member States, for areas as significant as atmospheric 
pollution, water quality, marine conservation and waste management.  These alongside the 
                                                 
1
 This again reflects internal problems with attempts to introduce sustainability requirements into the Union’s 
many activities through the Cardiff Process and more recently the Sustainable Development Strategy. 
2
 Since 1993 commentators have usually referred to the European Union – encompassing both the European 
Community (Pillar I of the structure agreed at Maastricht in 1992) and the Member States. However, in 
discussing the external role of the Union it is sometimes necessary to make the legal distinction between the 
Community which has its own competencies, is represented by the Commission and has international legal 
personality and the EU as a whole. At the UN, the distinction between the Community, which only has observer 
status, and the Member States who attempt to co-ordinate their actions as members of the EU, is particularly 
important.  
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environmental and conservation aspects of the common policies for commerce, agriculture 
and fisheries mean that the Community has a substantial policy responsibility for the content 
of most of the forty chapters of Agenda 21.  
 
Deriving in part from its acquisition of internal legislative powers, the European 
Community has been able to extend its activities to the negotiation of multilateral 
environmental agreements.
1
  It has played a leading role in the 1989 Basel Convention on 
hazardous waste, in the 1999 and 2001 conventions on prior informed consent procedures for 
hazardous chemicals (PIC) and persistent organic pollutants (POPs), and in the negotiation of 
the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on biosafety. In all, it is now a signatory, alongside the Member 
States, to in excess of 60 MEAs.
2
  The negotiating histories of recent conventions indicate 
that the EU has seized the opportunity provided by US abandonment of its previous 
undisputed role as a leader in international environmental policy. In doing so it has often 
provided a fulcrum around which the competing positions of the US and its allies and the G77 
have revolved.  Most striking, especially in its own estimation, but also in that of outsiders, 
has been the EU’s leadership on the climate change issue.  Having initially resisted the 
flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, it became their champion.  There can be little 
doubt that the long-delayed elaboration and ratification of the Protocol stands as an 
achievement of the Union.  It is, then, a very substantial, even dominant, player in 
international environmental politics.  
  
To characterise the Union in such terms is to make assumptions about its status as an 
actor.  That it constitutes a single entity distinguishable from its component 27 Member 
States, capable of volition and recognised by outsiders . In this special issue, a similar 
assumption is made about the G77, but the EU is as different from the latter as it is from the 
state actors that  also figure ( Vogler 1999, Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). For the international 
lawyers it is sui generis, not really comparable with any other entity in the international 
system. To use the template of the Westphalian state to measure the European Union would 
be to set up a standard that is in many ways irrelevant, for – despite the fears of eurosceptics – 
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 The Community was granted the right to take over the making of external policy from the Member States in 
specified areas by the TEC (see Arts. 133, 300). Elsewhere, and in the case of most environmental policy, it 
automatically acquired external competence when internal competence was granted. This was established by the 
European Court of Justice in ECJ 22/70, the European Road Transport Agreement case.  
2
 For further details on the extent and modes of EU participation see Vogler (2003). Of the 79 agreements listed 
in the 2003-4 Yearbook of  International Cooperation on Environment and Development, the Community was a 
signatory of 39 in its own right with the Member States representing the Union in a number of others such as 
CITES, the ocean dumping conventions and MARPOL. 
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the EU is not in a position to become a European federation or to usurp the core sovereignty 
of its Member States. Neither may we portray it as an over-developed international 
organisation (as opposed to a deficient state). Yet it is clearly recognised as a significant and, 
on occasion, powerful actor by those who encounter it. Its policy competencies and legal 
personality, its power to bind its members, to spend large amounts of money, to exert leverage 
and to develop complex policy, put it in a very different class to an alliance of states. 
  
The simple assertion that the EU ‘acts’ may, in practice, mean a number of things.  In 
terms of procedure and responsibilities, the distribution of competence is highly significant 
and can explain some of the anomalies observed at international negotiations where different 
people may represent the Union at different times. Competence is the EU term for powers and 
there are some policy areas where, either through treaty provisions or through internal rule-
making, exclusive competence has passed from the Member States to the EC. The classic 
example is provided by the Common Commercial Policy (Art.133) where only the 
Community has the right to set tariffs and engage in trade negotiations. This in effect means 
that the Commission will represent the whole EU and the Member State representatives will 
remain silent, saving their objections and arguments for private meetings (in the case of trade 
this will mean the Article 133 Committee). Under exclusive competence normal Community 
decision-making procedures will apply. The Commission possesses an exclusive right of 
initiative but the Member State representatives in the Council will agree legislation and 
negotiating mandates usually by qualified majority vote. Under co-decision procedures the 
European Parliament will also have to agree legislation.  As mentioned above, the 
Community has acquired exclusive competence for a number of significant aspects of 
environmental policy and there is little doubt that, when operating externally under exclusive 
competence, the EU appears at its most impressive as a single purposive actor, led by the 
Commission. In terms of environmental policy, broadly conceived, exclusive competence 
under the Common Fisheries Policy has meant that the Commission represented the Union at 
the negotiation of the 1995 UN agreement on Fish Stocks and at various international 
fisheries commissions.  
  
But there are also many areas of policy, involving defence, taxation and energy for 
example, where exclusive competence has been jealously retained by the Member States. The 
clearest example is provided by the Common Foreign and Security Policy where decision-
making procedures remain intergovernmental, an effective national veto is retained, and 
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where the Commission is merely ‘associated’. The practice under exclusive Member State 
competence is for the ‘President in office’ to represent the Union. With the failure to adopt the 
reforms contained within the Constitutional Treaty, the Presidency continues to rotate 
between the Member States on a six-monthly basis. The Presidency may be assisted by the 
‘troika’ which now adds a representative of the state which will hold the succeeding 
presidency and a representative of the Commission.   
  
For most environmental policy neither form of competence is fully applicable. Instead, 
competence is said to be ‘shared’ or concurrent and agreements are described as ‘mixed’.   
The precise mix will vary and there are some areas of policy in which the Community has 
very extensive competence and where the Commission essentially dominates external policy. 
The Basel negotiations on hazardous waste and PIC and POPs provide examples. One aspect 
of this is legal and the often relates to the precise treaty article under which action is being 
taken (Arts.133 or 175, for example) but there is also the practical question of technical 
capability whereby the Commission may take a leading role because it has the necessary 
expertise or ability to develop a European approach. Climate Change negotiations, for 
example, are led by the Presidency but the Commission is always included and plays a 
significant part. Furthermore, certain Member States have tended to specialise on certain 
issues and are allowed to take a leading role.  The Commission participated in international 
environmental negotiations concerning the Rhine and Mediterranean during the 1970s, but a 
critical breakthrough occurred in the talks to establish the 1979 Long Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution Convention (LRTAP). Here the concept of an REIO (Regional Economic 
Integration Organisation) was established, which allows the Community to participate and 
sign agreements alongside the Member States. In marked contrast to the situation in other UN 
fora, an REIO clause is now a standard feature of modern environmental conventions (for 
example the biodiversity and climate conventions). At a conference or meeting of the parties 
to one of these conventions up to 28 EU delegations may be present, all the Member States 
and the Commission. Either the Commission or the Presidency may speak for all, depending 
upon the precise distribution of competencies for the issues under discussion, and it is 
possible for the Commission to cast the votes of all the Member States. 
 
The UN remains an organisation of sovereign states and its bodies generally do 
not have an REIO clause. In fact, the Community is only a full member of the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It was 
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granted observer status by a General Assembly Resolution (29 GA Res. 3208) of 1974.  
Led by the President in Office, EU Member States increasingly co-ordinate their 
national approaches at the UN and provide the largest part of the organisation’s regular 
budget while the Commission has delegations accredited to most UN bodies including 
UNEP with its headquarters in Nairobi.
1
 The 2004 enlargement of the Union had some 
novel implications in relation to the UN’s regional group structure. The pre-2004 
Member States are members of the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) where 
they were joined by Malta.  Eight other accession states were in the East European 
Group, while Cyprus remains in the Asian Group.
2
 As will be observed below, the 
Community continues to have limited status and attempts to extend it have been resisted 
– sometimes by the Member States themselves, by the Eastern bloc during the Cold 
War, and latterly by the United States.  
                                                                                                                                                      
The Rio Process 
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) at Rio in 1992 
was the first global showcase for the Union's emerging actorness. Whereas its predecessor, 
the UNCHE at Stockholm in1972, was influenced by the rudiments of European Community 
environmental policy, UNCED witnessed the emergence of the Community as a 'full 
participant' for the first time (Mensah 1996: 32) Despite the extensive degree of Community 
competence for the issues under discussion, the Commission had to negotiate hard for 
expanded recognition in advance of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit to acquire speaking rights 
equivalent to those of state participants. Its achievement was memorialised in a footnote to 
Agenda 21 which stated that: 
 
When the term governments is used, it will be deemed to include the European 
Economic Community within its areas of competence. 
  
                                                 
1
 In 2003 contributions were distributed as follows: EU15 36.8%, US 22%, Japan 19.5%, Accession 10 0.9%, 
Rest of the world 20.7%: Commission 2003, The enlarging European Union at the United Nations: Making 
multilateralism matter, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications:6.  
2
  UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Major UN Groups and  Major Groupings Relating to the UN System 
April 2006, www.fco.gov.uk/files/kfile/unmajorgroupsandgroupingsApril2006.pdf. Group membership is 
important because they form the constituencies from which states are elected to serve on various UN bodies 
including ECOSOC, CSD and UNEP. Also selected on a group basis are the bureaux which have a continuing 
administrative role when conferences or commissions are not in session. 
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The other participants insisted that this should not create any form of legal precedent and have 
since made the status of the EC a matter of bargaining and persuasion in major UN fora.
1
 It is 
worth remembering that UNCED was, at the time, the largest diplomatic gathering ever held 
and that there were inevitably underlying issues of status and recognition. Thus for 
Commission officials it was important that its president Jacques Delors was afforded equal 
treatment to other heads of government – including, of course, those of the Member States.2      
 
 The Commission played a very active role at the UNCED PrepComs, inserting text 
into Agenda 21 but without insisting on the inclusion of trade, an issue area in which it would 
have had substantial influence on the basis of its competencies and the size of the Single 
Market. The failure to forge a coherent link between its environmental objectives and trade
3
 
and live up to its purported 'green' leadership role represents one of the enduring problems, or 
perhaps lost opportunities, of the Union. On another flank, the Member States (but not at this 
stage the Commission) had been negotiating what was to become the UNFCCC in the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee. Late in the day, prior to UNCED, a concession by 
the British Presidency ensured that the US would sign the Convention, but only at the price of 
removing binding commitments to greenhouse gas emissions reductions. The then EC 
Commissioner for Environment, Ripa de Meana, refused to attend UNCED after the failure to 
agree on a convention on forests and the concession on greenhouse gas emissions, opining 
that: 'We are not only not saving the earth; we are not even saving our own consciences' .
4
     
 
Much of the business of the conference turned into a dispute over the aid 
commitments to the South that would be the basis upon which it could accept the 
environmental requirements of the North, particularly the continuing failure to live up to the 
long established target of 0.7% of GDP.  On the latter the EC Member States were divided – 
with France, the Netherlands and Denmark in favour and the UK opposed. Najam (2003: 369) 
is quite justified in writing that the Rio compact on sustainable development – the new 
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 Although the same formula was used for EC participation in subsequent UN conferences on Habitat, Health 
and Environment and Food Summit of 1996, it took three weeks of preparatory discussion to insert it into the 
documentation of the UN General Assembly Special Session which reviewed UNCEFD in June 1997 
(Vogler,1999:34). 
2
 Delors did attend but was prevented from speaking at the UNCED final Plenary. As the leaders departed he, 
perhaps symbolically, found it necessary to hitch a ride on French President Mitterand’s Concorde. At the 1997 
meeting of the General Assembly Jacques Santer was afforded equivalent status.  
3
 In this instance the problem was one of coherence within the Commission where the trade DG tended to over-
rule environment on the grounds that such matters should be dealt with under the GATT Uruguay Round which 
should not be complicated by the proceedings at UNCED (Interview Commission, 2006). 
4
 Carlo Ripa di Meana ‘Why I will stay away from the Earth Summit’ Guardian, 30 may 1992.  The principal 
reason appears to have been the failure of the Member States to agree on a proposal for carbon taxation. 
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understanding on environment and development between North and South – "was always 
understood to be an expression of desire rather than reality". It surely was the strong desire of 
some within the EU, but the beginning economic downturn and internal resistance to the 
guiding norm of sustainable development undermined the Union's commitment – not only in 
financial terms. 
 
Despite the difficulties encountered by the Europeans in this first appearance on the 
stage of global environmental governance, the overall outcome was a success – not so much 
for sustainable development but for the reputation of the EC. This was relative to the 
performance of the United States for whom the Rio proceedings were widely regarded as a 
diplomatic disaster. It is worthwhile to quote the views of a sceptical UK participant here, 
who compared the very different performances of the USA and the EC where the Member 
States: 
 
"…many of which had problems similar to those identified by the Americans on such 
central issues as increased aid for the developing world, the deficiencies of the 
biodiversity convention, and high-cost action to tackle climate change, nevertheless 
managed to emerge from the process with their bridges to the rest of the world 
reinforced rather than undermined and their influence and standing enhanced rather 
than eroded" (Brenton, 1994: 234-5). 
 
His explanation is interesting for it turns upon the relative insularity of the United States for 
whom policy has a domestic focus, by contrast: 
 
The EC nations, by virtue of their size and proximity, are by now well adjusted and 
attuned to doing environmental business by international negotiation. They have 
learned to be attentive to international currents of opinion and to be ready to look for 
compromises to get an agreed result (ibid.:235).  
 
Five years after Rio, states assembled once again at the Special Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly in June 1997 (UNCED+5), but due to general distrust and lack of action on 
Agenda 21 and the North's financial commitment, the session turned into an often 
acrimonious, aptly termed "do-nothing event" (Agarwal et al. 2001: 198). The EU reaffirmed 
its commitment to sustainable development and presented some new initiatives on water, 
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energy, eco-efficiency and climate change. And, arguably again by default, it thus bolstered 
its status as the leader in international environmental affairs (Jordan and Voisey 1998: 97). Its 
proposals, however, did not meet with widespread support. The Dutch Presidency understood 
that G77 and China would not agree to any new compromises unless the Union showed some 
action on its Rio pledges, yet France and Germany scuppered the intended rethink on ODA 
(ibid: 94). In sum, not least due to the USA's palpable disinterest in environmental governance 
and this summit in particular, the EU claimed leadership once more, but it was at best 
commanding a ship at anchor. 
 
World Summit on Sustainable Development: holding ground 
 
"Compared to WSSD, UNCED was the soul of generosity", mused Tom Bigg (2003) only one 
year after states had convened at Johannesburg once more to review progress towards 
sustainable development. With the benefit of hindsight, this may not even be an exaggeration, 
although the European Union worked hard to avoid another stalled summit like in 1997.
1
 
Even a new mobilising idea had been found: taking up a term coined by the South African 
Environment Minister Moosa, the EU proposed to work towards a 'global deal' at the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) preparatory meeting for the WSSD in 
September 2001 (Bigg 2003). The problem with it was its timing, above all. The Danish non-
paper (2001) outlining its proposed elements was produced a mere ten months before the 
summit itself. In principle, the 'global deal' should have been an attractive package for 
developing countries, offering better access to Northern markets and increased ODA, and 
demanding an explicit commitment to the Rio Declaration coupled with implementation in 
return. This was similar to the original 'Rio compact' itself and it was hoped to give 
Johannesburg a central, overarching achievement. Nonetheless, for reasons discussed below 
the 'global deal' generated little enthusiasm from key negotiating parties. 
 
As the WSSD drew near, the 'global deal' was quietly being abandoned. The General 
Affairs Council Conclusions of 17 June 2002 recalled that the "EU remains open to discuss 
proposals made by partners or which could emerge from the international debate until 
Johannesburg." Furthermore, in February 2002, Commissioner Wallström mused that "the 
terminology is much less important than the actions we sign up to" and declared that – in 
                                                 
1
 Its preparation for the summit was meticulous, though not without fault. A stream of different Council 
conclusions, Commission communications and overarching pronouncements from the European Council 
accompanied the countdown to Johannesburg. 
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order to avoid the expected lowest-common-denominator results – the EU would search for 
"coalitions of willing people" through a form of flexible geometry (Wallström 2002a).
1
  
 
In essence, in 2002, DG Environment fought battles and searched for coalitions on 
two fronts at the same time. Internally, Commissioner Wallström struggled to create a good 
working relationship with Development Commissioner Nielsen with whom she shared the 
position of 'chef de file'. Besides the apparent "lack of chemistry" between them (Lightfoot 
and Burchell 2005: 82), the development sector was located in the strategically favourable 
median position between the DG Environment and DG Trade, the latter effectively promoting 
a neo-liberal agenda of poverty reduction through trade liberalisation (see ECOFIN Council 
2002).
2
 Such internal diversity of aims was a major barrier in the negotiations. 
 
It hardly helped the Union's internal cohesion that different member states had put 
forward rather diverging visions of the aims at Johannesburg and the possible content of 
'global deal'. Surveying the discussion papers produced in the run-up to the conference, one is 
struck by the different emphases chosen by Sweden and the U.K. The former called for a 
reinvigorated commitment to sustainable development through, inter alia, strengthening 
international environmental governance (IEG) and creating "clear links from the normative 
agenda to operational efforts" (Swedish EU Discussion Paper 2001: 4). The latter gave 
emphasis to "a strong focus on poverty eradication" and suggested that, due to a "growing gap 
between commitments and implementation", the "WSSD should have a focus on delivery" 
(UK Note 2001). Put differently, Sweden pressed for institution-building and action while 
Britain presented a toned-down version of the pragmatic and problem-solving approach that 
was also proffered by the USA. The UK position was designed to "address issues of wider 
concern" (ibid), highlighted the ideal of development, and favoured market-based instruments 
rather than simply pushing for environmental sustainability. "[W]e do not want institutional 
issues to dominate the Summit, distracting from achieving real action", it intoned (ibid.). A 
Europeanised version of this perspective won the day at Johannesburg because it was the least 
contentious, contained something positive for everyone, demonstrated some achievement, and 
could thus best survive the "difficult political backdrop" (Wallström 2002b) of the summit. 
                                                 
1
 This did indeed happen at the WSSD: the EU assembled a coalition for renewable energy which did not impose 
any stringent conditions and hence attracted a good number of signatories. 
2
 Following the recognition of the Millennium Development Targets (MDGs) as a new master frame for 
sustainable development and the ongoing efforts of the WTO's Doha Development Agenda (DDA), 
Johannesburg's focus was plainly on poverty eradication (Bigg 2003). All this significantly reduced DG 
Environment's room for manoeuvre and opportunities for influence. 
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Externally, the Union found itself with international negotiating parties that were 
either still distrustful of its objectives and credibility (G77 and China) or openly opposed to 
further institutional strengthening, financial commitments and principled language with 
normative implications (US and allied countries). The idea of a 'global deal' to reaffirm the 
'spirit of Rio' and commit to action of a list of targets and timetables was thus seen as 
unattractive by either group. The US stance, in particular, had shifted over the previous years 
from obstructive passivity to principled opposition to many multilateral projects on the 
environment.
1
  
 
The lack of international support underlined the central problem of many 
environmental negotiations – how to convince those parties who do not share the same 
priorities of the need for a comprehensive outcome package (Lightfoot and Burchell 2004: 
341). The fundamental differences with the US position made this a valiantly futile effort 
indeed, but arguably, the global South could have been courted more effectively. Instead, 
when attempts at revitalising the Rio discourse floundered, the EU channelled its energy into 
defending the language and commitments of sustainable development accumulated over the 
past decade of IEG (Lightfoot and Burchell 2005: 89). This defensive posture may largely be 
blamed for the singular failure of addressing the topic of trade in any meaningful sense. The 
Doha Development Round, it appears, was on everyone's mind, but at the same time it 
remained curiously out of reach. In fact, as Bigg (2003) reports, due to US insistence on the 
primacy of the WTO, "there was a real danger that the message coming from Johannesburg 
would be that environmental policy should be subservient to economic policy". EU trade 
officials seemed to go along with this until the scheme ran into last-minute opposition from 
Ethiopia, Norway, and Switzerland (see Rosendal, this volume). 
 
Despite this sobering assessment, it should also be recognised that defending the ideal 
of sustainable development against powerful contenders has been no small matter (Lightfoot 
and Burchell 2005: 89), especially at a time when the global agenda revolves around the 
MDGs. Besides the global conferences, however, the EU has had other opportunities to make 
greater progress, for instance with regard to institutional reform of environmental governance. 
In particular, the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and the United Nations 
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 As Marsh (2005: 145) points out, "Recent years have seen environmental issues become a more prominent, 
recurring and frequently contentious agenda item in the transatlantic relationship." 
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Environment Programme (UNEP) offer fruitful material for further analysis of the Union's 
role. 
 
 
Commission on Sustainable Development: towards a practical politics 
 
Established in 1993, the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) has a two-fold 
mission of continuous political dialogue and guidance for sustainable development policy. 
This made for an ambitious agenda and underlined its official status as the forum for UNCED 
follow-up activities (Mensah 1996; Chasek, this volume). The CSD's location under the 
ECOSOC umbrella should have perhaps given observers pause for thought.
1
 Being one of its 
functional commissions and equipped with no real political authority, legal powers or proper 
financial resources proved to be a heavy burden on the fledgling CSD (Wagner 2005: 107). It 
was, in other words, a doomed attempt to "maintain a high-profile leadership role on the Rio 
follow-up from a relatively low place in the institutional hierarchy" (Hyvarinen and Brack 
2000: 25). 
 
This was either done on purpose or through a temporary suspension of political acumen. Rio's 
positive spirit and a belief in the ultimate persuasiveness of sustainable development would 
explain US Vice-President Gore's description of the CSD's purpose as  
 
“focusing attention on issues of common interest; serving as a forum for raising 
ideas an plans; helping resolve issues that arise as nations proceed in their 
sustainable development agendas; monitoring progress; and helping shift the 
multilateral financial institutions and bilateral assistance efforts towards a 
sustainable development agenda (Bigg and Dodds cited in Wagner 2005: 103).” 
 
This vision of consensual or at least cooperative problem-solving has not come to pass, for it 
underestimated the enormous political stakes inherent in the sustainable development agenda 
and the staying power of the North-South schism.
2
 Instead, the CSD developed into "another 
UN talk shop" (Agarwal et al. 2001: 170) where language served not as the medium of 
                                                 
1
 ECOSOC has for decades been on the sidelines of the UN system, even though it had originally been intended 
to be at the core of it – together with the General Assembly. 
2
 In 2001, a Southern delegate deplored that – after ten years of negotiation – delegates were still not able to 
agree on "a satisfactory definition of sustainable development" (ENB 2001-04: 12). Given its notoriously 
ambiguous meaning and political usefulness, this should not have come as a surprise. 
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dialogue and understanding, but of normative posturing and legalistic defensiveness. This 
dynamic has only begun to change for the better after a CSD reform was agreed at 
Johannesburg. 
 
The CSD posed another problem because it was an elective body in which not all the 
member States would be present. It took until the second session to resolve the issue of EC 
participation. This involved the granting of speaking rights, the rights to put propositions but 
not to vote on the understanding that there would be no increase in the representation to which 
Member States were already entitled (Mensah 1996: 32). Of the 53 elected state members of 
the CSD, there have generally been eight or nine EU participants. France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom have been present at all the sessions up to date
1
, which shows that they have 
taken the new forum very seriously and aim to influence the EU position through their direct 
access to the discussions.  
 
The Union only attained the status of 'full participant' (without the right to vote) in February 
1995 and has traditionally relied on a 'lead-country' approach in the CSD (Vogler 2003: 66; 
Cameron 2004: 162). This flexible arrangement means that the current Presidency of the 
European Council will articulate the common EU position while leaving specific issue-areas 
(e.g. freshwater) to particular member states who have accumulated expertise or a heightened 
interest in the matter. The result has been a broadly consistent and competent advocacy role of 
the Union. Many EU countries had been among the chief instigators of the CSD at UNCED 
and consequently, the EU position has often been proactive and forward-looking. The CSD 
bears the norm of sustainable development in its name and was hoped to become the primary 
'watchdog' over its progressive integration into UN and affiliated institutional policies. After 
UNGASS 1997, the EU began to argue for a re-orientation of the CSD towards a more 
pragmatic, goal-oriented purpose – a plea that was shared by other delegations at 
Johannesburg and resulted in a noticeable institutional overhaul. 
 
In 1994, when the CSD held its first genuine meetings, EU statements already 
revealed a certain 'practical' outlook, for instance when the Greek Presidency declared that 
"CSD decisions must be short and action-oriented and political impetus is vital" (ENB 1994). 
Several months later, the German Presidency added that "the CSD needs dialogue instead of 
debate and an integrated approach to the inter-related questions of sustainable development" 
                                                 
1
 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable Development, Record of CSD 
Members and Bureau (1993-2006),http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csd/csdolmem.htm 
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(ENB 1994). There is a sense of political weariness here that would only increase further as 
the years went by. From a European perspective, the CSD's task was to implement, and not 
re-negotiate, the Rio agenda. Dialogue, if based on a consensual understanding, was welcome, 
but long-winded and principled debates were not. The normative grid had been laid at Rio and 
its continued political scrutiny would slow down or even undermine the European project of 
global sustainable development. 
 
This thinking informed the EU's strategy in the CSD. However, after UNGASS the 
voices calling for action and implementation grew louder. From 1998 onwards, the EU – 
concerned that nothing was being done on the ground – began pressing for more stringent 
national reporting requirements and ultimately even for monitoring arrangements (e.g. ENB 
1998; ENB 2003; ENB 2005).
1
 The governments of the global South responded with dismay 
and made sure that UNGASS foundered on the rocks of distrust and bitterness. European 
negotiators started to realise that the "global partnership for sustainable development" was 
losing acceptance (ENB 1997), but there was little they could do in the short run
2
. Towards 
the new millennium, however, the negative trend in official development assistance (ODA) 
was gradually being reversed. EU initiatives on freshwater and energy that had stalled during 
the acrimonious rifts of 1997-98 became a realistic proposition and Northern countries in 
general began to look for the 'pragmatic' de-politicisation of the CSD which had been naively 
assumed, rather than devised, at its inception. 
 
The Union has certainly cultivated what Wagner (2005: 112) has called a "driving 
strategy": having assiduously prepared its positions and alternative arguments before the 
meetings, the EU "often presents action proposals rather than solely responding to others' 
suggestions." Under the guise of such forward-looking and often "problem-solving" proposals 
(Wagner 1999) the EU has sought to dominate the political agenda and direct the debate away 
from political principles towards the practical implementation of sustainable development. 
Despite the sincere intentions behind this tactic, the strategic, political impact should not be 
underestimated. So successful was the Union's 'driving strategy' that, in a 2001 expert group 
on energy questions, several G77 delegates complained that the Chair's negotiating text 
mostly reflected "European perceptions of the energy issue" (ENB 2001b: 7). This example 
                                                 
1
 This agenda was later complemented by a common Northern appeal for 'good governance' to ensure the 
effective spending of money, the respect of human rights, and a certain measure of transparency (ENB 2005: 4). 
2
 Environmental ministries and the EU's DG Environment are not in control of the national budgets. Their 
priorities, despite the EU's official Rio commitments, were way down the list of finance ministries. 
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demonstrates that the EU's desire for policy and norm diffusion was not only relatively 
influential, but also that it frequently collided with the wishes of watchful counterparts. 
 
Overall, it is obvious that the attempts at indirect agenda-setting and de-politicisation 
were more successful than direct proposals for national regimes of implementation and 
monitoring. Joining forces with the JUSCANZ group led by the USA at Johannesburg, the EU 
achieved a considerable reform of the CSD. The new plan allowed for a review year between 
fully-fledged CSD negotiation sessions and stepped up the involvement of technical experts, 
civil society and industry groups.
1
 The CSD's first review session in 2004 is a good 
illustration of a waning North-South schism. Its agenda was very close indeed to the EU's 
preference of having just a handful of topics for each negotiation cycle. The meeting itself 
was dominated by experts exchanging their experiences about the problems they faced in 
implementing specific local projects. Weighty political issues such as global trade 
immediately lost much of their salience in this new, 'pragmatic' context. In fact, the subject of 
trade was not even broached. 
 
In sum, the CSD is approaching the EU's objective of being a forum for practical 
implementation and a loudspeaker for sustainable development. A Swedish EU discussion 
paper (2001: 5) had spelt out a number of desirable reforms
2
. The other EU Member States 
appear to have agreed on this direction and the reformed CSD came quite close to 
incorporating the desired aspects. This also demonstrates the structural power and diplomatic 
perseverance of the EU as an international actor. Yet ultimately, the CSD is still solely a small 
piece in the jigsaw of GEG. Apart from the global conferences on environment and 
development, the Union has focused most of its attention on strengthening the status of 
UNEP. The intuition behind this project is that the concept of sustainable development 
becomes hostage to diverse interests unless there is a strong environmental sector clamouring 
for environmental sustainability
3
.The transformation of UNEP into a specialised agency, the 
United Nations Environment Organisation (UNEO), could create a new, potent environmental 
supervisory body. 
 
                                                 
1
 This was at the expense of what some called the "New York mafia" (ENB 2001c: 12) of seasoned diplomats 
with little grasp of or interest in matters of practical implementation. 
2
 It recommended a "focus on the practical/technical level", a "high level segment every second year", a limited 
thematic work programme, targets and indicators, the exchange of practical experiences regarding the 
implementation of Agenda 21 and further "development of multi-stakeholder dialogue". 
3
 In contrast to what some may have assumed at the time of UNCED, sustainable development does not replace 
the environment as political priority – it rather presupposes the latter in order to function appropriately. 
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UNEP: edging forward inch by inch 
 
Since the creation of UNEP at the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, it has 
counted the EU among its staunchest supporters. This backing has been visible both by the 
disproportionate amount of funding provided and by the EU's consistent endorsement of 
institutional strengthening and a secure financial base for UNEP. The optimism of the early 
1990s and the Rio summit gave rise to a stronger and more self-confident environmental 
organisation that found itself at the forefront of new political initiatives, though it has at times 
looked overburdened with the growing number of demands placed on it. The UNEP 
Governing Council and its GMEF formation are composed of 58 governments elected by the 
General Assembly for a four-year term on the basis of ‘equitable regional representation’. For 
2006-7, this has meant that twelve EU Member States are present.
1
 The Community only 
enjoys observer status, but collaborates with the organisation under the terms of a 
'Memorandum of Understanding' signed in 2004 by the EU Environment Commissioner and 
the UNEP Executive Director. The EU and its Member States are the most significant donors 
to UNEP’s Environment Fund2, with both the UK and Netherlands contributions ranking 
above that of the USA and other Member States occupying eleven places amongst the top 
twenty donors
3
.       
 
UNEP's "peculiar dual mandate" (Imber 1993: 58) of being both catalyser and 
coordinator has indeed been the source of persistent practical headaches. Its comparatively 
small budget (60 million US-Dollars in 2000) means that it cannot aspire to be a "delivery 
agency" (Dodds 2000: 294), but has to rely on scientific fact-finding, persuasion, and 
advances in international environmental law. This catalytic role has been assumed with 
surprising success (Najam 2003), although it does not measure up to the much greater 
European ambitions of creating a strengthened and more unified system of environmental 
governance. Nor is the lack of coordinative muscle a historical accident of ad hoc regime 
creation (Najam 2003: 372) 
 
With regard to the EU's plans for a strong environmental pillar in the UN system, there 
were only two positive options available (Imber 1993). One would have been to redistribute 
                                                 
1
 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK from WEOG and Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania from the East European Group.  
2
 On US contributions, see Chasek (this volume). 
3
 Cumulative contributions for 2004-6 were UK – $ 23.5 m., Netherlands - $ 18.29 m, USA $ 18.23. 
http://www.unep.org/rmu/en/financing_of_UNEP/Environment_Fund/Table_Major_Don… 
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the coordination mandate to other institutions and concentrate on the catalytic potential. This 
has actually happened to some extent, for the CSD and the Environment Management Group 
(EMG), set up in 1993 and 2001 respectively, have been entrusted with mainstreaming 
sustainable development and environmental aspects. The second option was to recast UNEP 
as a specialised agency with increased funding and strengthened authority. It is this latter 
objective which has now become the Union's official agenda for GEG. But between Imber's 
initial analysis in 1993 and EU's public commitment to a UNEO lay at least eleven years 
filled with a succession of institutional proposals and tactical moves. 
 
The period between Rio and UNGASS in 1997 is today known as the 'dark hour' of UNEP as 
an organisation
1
. A number of states (including Germany, South Africa, Singapore, Brazil) 
came to UNEP's rescue at the summit and proposed the creation of a World Environment 
Organisation (WEO) (Dodds 2000: 302). However, neither had they sufficiently prepared 
their initiative, nor were most countries willing to contemplate the financial resources 
required for this reform. It was perhaps a brave proposition, but the timing could not have 
been much worse. 
 
Only one year later, the UN Task Force on Environment and Development 
recommended the establishment of an 'Environment Management Group' (EMG) that would 
be chaired by UNEP's Executive Director and involve many other UN bodies and affiliated 
financial institutions (Hyvarinen and Brack 2000: 32). Finally, in 2001, the EMG was indeed 
set up and charged with improving "UN system-wide inter-agency coordination related to 
specific issues in the field of environment and human settlements through a comprehensive 
series of measures designed to enhance coherent and coordinated action within the UN system 
in these areas" (EMG 2006). The EU often expressed its "high hopes" for the EMG (EU 
Presidency Statement 2000, 2001a), regarding it as "a first step in the right direction" 
(Environment Council 2000). After a few years, the realisation has set in that the EMG "has 
not met expectations, suffering from a relatively weak mandate and status" (EU Speaking 
Points 2006a).
2
  
                                                 
1
 Some observers argued that the UNCED mandate reaffirmed UNEP as the main environmental organisation 
and gave it more responsibilities than ever before (Timoshenko and Berman 1996: 45). Yet, whereas political 
attention focused on the newly created CSD and developing countries grew increasingly restless in the face of 
Northern refusal to honour financial promises, UNEP was additionally burdened by a wavering leadership. By 
the time of UNGASS, it had been labelled as largely irrelevant (ENB 1999: 11). 
2
 However, like in the case of the CSD, the Union is not ready to discard this instrument. Seeing it as part of an 
overarching framework of GEG reform, a more powerful EMG, backed up with a mandate from the Global 
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The supposed remedy, an overarching European project of GEG reform, gradually 
took shape in the run-up to the Johannesburg summit in 2002. With the CSD in crisis and the 
norm of sustainable development coming under renewed pressure, the constitution of an 
environmental pillar within the UN system was deemed the best way forward. Official EU 
statements during this time were still phrased in quite general terms. Pointing out UNEP's 
financial problems and its lack of authority, the Swedish Presidency referred to further EU 
proposals "for a greatly improved coordination under the aegis of UNEP of all relevant 
institutions to harmonise activities on a thematic basis" (EU Presidency Statement 2001b).
1
 
 
Meanwhile, political debates in UNEP were already raging. Having renewed their 
commitment to Agenda 21 and professed their faith in UNEP as an institution in the Malmö 
Declaration of May 2000, the members of the Governing Council (GC) gave a new lease of 
life to this beleaguered institution. Moreover, the EU, acting in concert with China and 
Hungary, had convinced participants to begin convening an annual high-level ministerial 
forum – the Global Ministerial Environment Forum (GMEF) – alongside the GC meetings 
(ENB 1999: 10)
2
. But the EU's ambitions did not stop there. When UNEP commenced 
preparing its input for the WSSD, the EU proposed an ad hoc intersessional working group 
for the review of options to strengthen GEG (ENB 2001a: 4).
3
  
 
The views of the major negotiating partners in this working group crystallised soon. 
The US could not agree with the ideas of improving coherence and enhancing integration of 
governance institutions. It maintained that "the US does not believe that current IEG is 
incoherent" (ENB 2001e:5), suggested that alleged 'fragmentation' and competition in the 
system was better seen as 'healthy tension' (ENB 2001d: 2), and contested a strengthened 
mandate for the GMEF.
4
 This obstructionism prompted an exasperated Swiss delegation to 
demand: "'Why are we here?" (ENB 2002: 5). The other major negotiating bloc (G77 & 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ministerial Environmental Forum, could address issues in need of horizontal coordination and even instruct the 
United Nations Development Group (UNDG) (EU Speaking Points 2006b). 
1
 The Environment Council (2001) ventured even further by submitting that the gradual adaptation of UNEP 
"could ultimately lead to a World Environment Organisation, respecting existing headquarters". 
2
 The US was mildly in favour of this idea, for they counted on the GMEF to reign in the bureaucratic power of 
UNEP officials (Rosendal, this volume). 
3
 The group met six times in total and held its last meeting at the seventh Special Session of the GC in February 
2002. The negotiations witnessed an eventual polarisation of positions, with the EU changing the focus of its 
reform proposals when it met an insurmountable impasse. 
4
 At the heart of US opposition was a straightforward rejection of greater codification and coherence which 
might eventually lead to regimes of monitoring and compliance or pose a threat to the WTO trading order by 
engaging in regulatory competition with it. 
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China) was only slightly more cooperative.
1
 Lingering distrust of an environmental and 
potentially anti-development agenda played as much a role here as the fear of greater 
monitoring competencies which could highlight countries' lack of implementation and 
undermine their national sovereignty. 
 
The EU thus found itself confronted with truly formidable diplomatic opposition and 
gradually ceased talking about a WEO or UNEO. Turning towards a more incremental 
strategy, European negotiators concentrated on upgrading the status of the GMEF and called 
for universal membership of the GC which, they hoped, would ultimately lead to a natural 
demand for the GMEF's executive powers. G77 & China were not so easily distracted, 
however, with Nigeria challenging supporters of an upgraded GMEF "to come straight out 
and say that they want a new global environmental body" (ENB 2001e: 5). 
 
At the final meeting in February 2002, the EU, a handful of allies, and their plea for 
extensive reform – including compliance monitoring, co-location of MEA secretariats and a 
stronger GMEF – faced a US-G77 coalition which opposed language about UNEP's enhanced 
role, the idea of a UNEO, and kept referring the issue of better coordination back to the EMG 
(ENB 2002). Interestingly, the EU still left this session with mild satisfaction and an 
optimistic perspective for Johannesburg. This may have been the quiet contentment of a 
normative power confident of its leadership: after all, apart from the G77's insistence on 
strengthening UNEP's original mandate (ENB 2002: 11), there were no serious alternative 
offers on the table. The search for allies could be a longer-term quest as long as the direction 
of reform proposals was right. 
 
European optimism was not borne out by the WSSD and its Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation (JPI). Although, as Commissioner Wallström (2003) rightly stated, the Union 
"did manage to reconfirm the need for international co-operation to address global 
sustainability challenges", the JPI merely gave a nod in the direction of institutional reform 
and invited UNGA to consider universal membership of UNEP's GC. Arguably as a result of 
this relative defeat, by late 2004 and hence in time for the Millennium Review Summit in 
September 2005, the EU had adopted a new negotiating objective. If, at the 8
th
 Special 
Session of the GC in April 2004, the case for a specialised agency (UNEO) was "deftly kept 
                                                 
1
 It supported a moderate strengthening of UNEP, including greater financial resources and better coordination 
of MEAs (ENB 2001d). Nonetheless, G77 also insisted on keeping the GMEF dependent on the GC and resisted 
any move towards a specialised agency (UNEO) or WEO. 
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afloat by France in the margins of various meetings" (ENB 2004: 8), it was already being 
discussed by a working group of interested countries (Lenzerini 2006; France-Diplomatie 
2006) and was soon elevated to the status of a common EU reform proposal.
1
 
 
At the same time, efforts were underway to hone the arguments in favour of universal 
membership. At an international round table organised by the German government and the 
think tank Ecologic, arguments for this particular reform were debated and improved. 
Participants emphasised that a common view on GC membership was essential in order to 
"not allow divisions within the EU to weaken its position" and "prepare the EU to speak 
clearly and with one voice" at the upcoming meetings (Ecologic Round Table 2004: 2-3).
2
  
 
The UNEO motion had become so attractive for EU policy-makers because it offered 
a compromise between the options of a moderately strengthened UNEP without much 
coordinative power and a fully-fledged WEO with all its problems of legitimacy and 
acceptability. A UNEO would represent an umbrella organisation for the numerous MEAs 
and it would thus achieve some much-needed rationalisation in GEG (Lenzerini 2006). The 
EU took this scenario to the UN World Summit 2005 where it sought to graft it onto the 
environmental aspects of the Secretary-General's report 'In Larger Freedom' from March 
2005. This report was based on a 2004 report by the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change which marked a conceptual shift by defining international security 
above all as human security.
3
  
 
Having perused successive drafts of the World Summit's Outcome Document, 
Morgera and Duran (2006) conclude that the EU managed to considerably raise the number of 
references to sustainable development. However, while a June draft made explicit references 
to aspects of environmental governance, such as a coherent institutional framework with 
better coordination and monitoring, the final outcome merely included a section on 
'Environmental Activities' and only promised to "explore the possibility of a more coherent 
                                                 
1
 The European Council in June 2005 proposed to initiate a process of institutional reform "which will lead to 
negotiations on the establishment of a UN agency for the environment" which, equipped with adequate funding 
and equal status to other specialised agencies, would help to mainstream the environmental dimension of 
sustainable development more effectively and consistently (European Council 2005: 11). 
2
 These efforts, however, were clearly part of an incremental strategy that aimed at obtaining realistic 
concessions from negotiating partners who were unlikely to sign up to a UNEO. Universal GC membership, as 
the round table document timidly mentioned, would "provide an additional impetus for reform of the governance 
structure" (Ecologic Round Table 2004: 3) and hence represent a first step forward. 
3
 It also "had the undisputable value of injecting for the first time environmental issues into the security dialogue, 
specifically focusing on climate change" (Morgera 2006: 17) – two innovations that chime very well with the 
Union's own new discourse on security. 
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institutional framework to address this need" (ibid: 17). It does, however, incorporate "respect 
for nature" in the section on principles and values and confirms sustainable development as "a 
key element of the overarching framework of United Nations activities", reproducing the 
language used in the JPI (Morgera 2006: 19). 
 
Recalling UNEP's stalled debate on institutional reform, one should not be too 
surprised about a modest outcome that primarily recycles agreed language from previous 
documents. The Union certainly made a strong case both for universal membership of the GC 
and for an indicative scale of contributions for the financing of UNEP – even before explicitly 
stating the objective of a UNEO in the run-up to the 2005 World Summit. Despite no 
enhancement of its mandate, the mere existence of the GMEF and its regular pronouncements 
– not least about the link between the environment and the MDGs – have already given UNEP 
a stronger voice on the international scene.
1
  
 
Finally, it is encouraging to observe that, on all matters of environment and 
sustainable development, the EU spoke with a single voice at the 2005 World Summit, thus 
acting as a "unified negotiating bloc" for its 25 members and an additional 9-11 associated 
countries (Morgera and Duran 2006: 20). Genuine influence or impact, however, is not only 
measured in terms of argumentative unity displayed at the negotiating table. It reaches much 
deeper, both temporally and structurally. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The preceding analysis has established, albeit imprecisely, that the EU has exercised influence 
at least in the setting of agendas if not in delivery, although this may sometimes fall short of 
its self-proclaimed leadership role.  This is consistent with its recent performance in other 
areas of global environmental governance, in the promotion of norms such as the 
precautionary principle and most significant of all, in the rescue of the Kyoto Protocol and the 
establishment of an international emissions trading system (Vogler 2005; Zito 2005). 
 
                                                 
1
 In a 'constructivist' fashion, the ENB (2005: 10) explains this through the growing importance of its "soft law 
statements". And it is perhaps the European Council that served the EU as a model for its preferred, strengthened 
version of the GMEF. 
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 There is a structural basis for EU influence as an actor  which may be conceptualised 
in terms of  its ‘presence’ in the international system.1 That is to say the sheer scale of the 
Single Market and the range of EU internal policies will have a profound and sometimes 
magnetic effect upon outsiders, particularly those which are close trading and aid partners and 
are located within the European region. This creates expectations that the EU will act and also 
ensures that EU positions in multilateral forums will be followed by states who have, or wish 
to have, a ‘membership perspective’ and to a certain extent by the dependent ACP countries. 
It is reinforced by the Union’s commitment to multilateralism and its enthusiasm, as 
demonstrated in the range of countries contributing to ESDP operations.  Since the 1980s, the 
Union’s attempts to assert itself in international environmental affairs have been assisted by 
changes in the opportunity structure. The ending of the Cold War and continuing difficulties 
with Soviet and Eastern Bloc recognition of the EC and the abdication by the United States of 
its previous leadership role have have been significant (cross reference Chasek this vol)). 
When faced with an obstructionist US and a coalition of G77 & China primarily interested in 
winning more financial and economic commitments and protecting their national sovereignty, 
it is not difficult to present oneself as the leader on the global environmental stage.    
 
In specific negotiations, internal unity is at first sight a critical precondition of 
'actorness' and influence. European leadership, Marsh (2005: 157) argues, is “proportional to 
its internal unity” whose degree, in turn, can often be discerned through the mandate 
conferred by the European Council or by carefully reading the Presidency statements 
reflecting a common EU position.  The implication here is that the major problem is one of 
persuading 27 Member States to take a consistent line.  The sheer number and variety of 
Member States is, indeed, daunting and there are opportunities for outsiders to exert influence 
by proxy, for instance by relying on a sympathetic “Trojan horse” that largely shares their 
views (Rhinard and Kaeding 2005: 9). The restricted membership of the CSD and UNEP 
Governing Council limits the numbers but there will always be the need for co-ordination 
meetings which mean that EU delegations have to get up early in advance of conference 
sessions and ‘the Nordics have to get up even earlier’ .(cross reference to Rosendal).2 
 
                                                 
1
 The concepts of ‘presence’ and ‘opportunity’ as the foundations of ‘actorness’ are derived from  Bretherton and 
Vogler (2006) and are applied to external environmental policy in Chapter 4.   
2
 Typically, Nordic meetings including Norway precede EU co-ordination meetings.  When asked about the 
influence of the Nordic group, a Commission official responded: ‘we are not supposed to know about that!’ 
(Interview, Commission,2006).  
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The problem of consistency between Member States themselves and the Commission 
ought not to be exaggerated. One of the key ways in which the EU must be distinguished from 
alliances such as the G77 or JUSCANZ is that it possesses a robust set of internal procedures 
and a supranational Commission.  The difference is especially clear when the Union is acting 
on issues within exclusive community competence where the Commission has exclusive 
rights of initiative and to represent the Union as a whole and where, in all probability, 
qualified majority voting can be used to settle differences. Even when competence is held by 
the Member States, the presidency and the Council Secretariat provide structure and the 
Commission can act as a ‘sheep-dog’ to round up wavering Member States although the 
problems of co-ordination are sometimes ‘horrendous’ (Interview Commission 2006). 
Furthermore, individual members have tended to specialise in particular issues and have 
played the role of ‘lead states’. In the environmental area policy has not been reduced to the 
lowest common denominator of agreement amongst the Member States, rather there is 
substantial evidence that ‘lead states’ have managed to raise the general level of ambition.  
Contrary to some expectations, the 2004 enlargement did not have a proportional effect upon 
the problem of co-ordination. Most of the new Member States are relatively small and ‘cannot 
afford to send delegations of more than one person (if that) to conferences and the larger 
states rarely have more than one or two people and do not say much’ (Interview Commission 
2006). Finally, questions of GEG are not likely to prove as divisive as those that concern 
Member States dealing with the politics of trade agreements where very specific national 
commercial interests are at stake (for example agricultural subsidies in the Doha Round or 
Chinese textile exports in mid 2005) or indeed in the CFSP where serious differences in 
political orientation sometimes prevent united action.         
   I 
The EU is in some ways comparable to a large federal state insofar as its external 
policy effectiveness may be compromised by internal ‘incoherence’. During the WSSD, there 
certainly was a significant division between the EU sectors of trade and the environment 
which led to the ultimately unsuccessful attempt at subordinating MEAs to the WTO. And 
Britain most likely worked behind the scenes to achieve a more ‘pragmatic’ result focused on 
flexible implementation mechanisms, which emphasised the role of private actors and public-
private partnerships. Similarly, in the preparations for UNCED, a preoccupation with trade 
issues and the importance of the Uruguay Round over-rode environmental considerations. 
There are still differences in the interpretation of sustainable development between the sectors 
of development and environment. As Opoku and Jordan (2005: 22) put it, "[t]he one language 
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of sustainable development is in this case perhaps only thinly veiling two still separate 
cultures." 
 
To be a credible leader – in the eyes of the developing world in particular – the Union 
has to get its internal policies right and create linkages with a coherent set of external policies. 
Those carrying the message of environmental protection and sustainable development onto 
the global stage should be able to show how they themselves have realised this project at 
home (Wallström 2002a; Solbes 2001). Secondly, the EU's external policy should reflect its 
international commitments, ranging from a long-standing aim to increase ODA to the impact 
of its trade or agricultural policies. It is critical here that the EU position is not seen in terms 
of "double standards", "neo-colonialism" or otherwise primarily self-interested strategy 
(Morgera and Duran 2006: 21). A year after the WSSD, Commissioner Wallström (2003) – 
with her memory of negotiations still fresh – repeatedly stressed that her priority was "policy 
coherence between external commitments and internal policies."  
 
In a sense, the analysis of the Union's deficiencies has thus come full circle by 
referring us back to its internal policy-making. Achieving the coherence Wallström demands 
would necessitate the creation of a relative harmony of purpose within the EU. But the 
constant compromises, corrections and even turn-arounds (e.g. with regard to ODA) 
undertaken to continue the at least tripartite mission of economic competitiveness, agricultural 
preservation and sustainable development result in a serious "role ambiguity" and "perceived 
inconsistency" (Chaban et al. 2006: 254) that saps the incipient credibility. And while there 
can often be large differences in framing environmental issues between the various Council 
formations, it is the European Council which is charged with synthesising these positions. 
Taking account of the various agendas, it seeks to reassure everyone around the table, which 
tends to produce an often ambivalent negotiation mandate. 
 
Consequently, our observations of EU influence in process of GEG reform are less the 
result of immaculate European strategising, unity of purpose or its powers of persuasion. 
Perseverant and intelligent agenda-setting may have played as much a role as contextual 
factors like the absence of serious competition. By putting forward principles and norms like 
sustainable development and precaution and by insisting on institutional movement towards 
more coherence, authority and coordination, the EU is often "able to define the international 
problem and provide a plausible solution early enough in the process to gain the advantage 
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over other actors" (Zito 2005: 372). And when the Union comes up against more proactive 
opposition – such as the attempts to renegotiate parts of Agenda 21 at Johannesburg – it 
generally proves itself to be a formidable blocking power, which is undoubtedly helped by its 
lack of negotiating flexibility arising from problems of co-ordination once the mandate has 
been defined. 
 
Leadership, regardless of how precisely it is created and sustained, does of course not 
always equal real influence. The latter's litmus test is perhaps rather the transition of other 
actors to different values (Lightfoot and Burchell 2005: 87) or a marked "redistribution of 
values" that Sjöstedt et al. (2005: 300) failed to find with regard to the historical record of 
GEG. On the other hand, there are also some signs that the Union's tenacity in fine-tuning 
tactics and arguments may finally be paying off. At the 2006 annual UNEP meeting, some 
observers felt that the principled opposition of important countries, such as Japan and China, 
to a UNEO may be weakening (ENB 2006: 14; Rosendal, this volume). Perhaps this also 
demonstrates that the often inflexible negotiating performance of the EU and the complex 
status of its actorness are not among its major deficiencies.  Credibility and coherence should 
be the objectives for a stronger, more effective Union on the international stage. Much harder 
to 'fix' than organisational or strategic aspects, they arguably represent the real challenge for 
the EU in today's global environmental governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
Bibliography 
 
Agarwal, Anil et al. (eds.) (2001), Poles Apart, New Delhi: Centre for Science and 
Environment. 
 
Bretherton, Charlotte and John Vogler (2006), The European Union as a Global Actor, 
Abingdon & New York: Routledge. 
 
Brenton,  Tony (1994) The Greening of Machiavelli: The Evolution of International 
Environmental Politics, London:RIIA/Earthscan. 
 
Cameron, Fraser (2004), “After Iraq: The EU and Global Governance”, Global Governance, 
Vol. 10, pp. 157-163. 
 
Chaban, Natalia et al. (2006), “The European Union As Others See It”, European Foreign 
Affairs Review, Vol. 11, pp. 245-262. 
 
Chasek, Pamela S. (2000), “The UN Commission on Sustainable Development: The First 
Five Years” in: Pamela S. Chasek (ed.), The Global Environment in the 21st Century: 
Prospects for International Cooperation, Tokyo: UNU Press. 
 
Danish Non-Paper (2001), "World Summit on Sustainable Development – 'A Global Deal'", 
02 October, URL= http://www.anped.org/PDF/WSSD%20EU%20papers.pdf [06/10/2006]. 
 
Dimas, Stavros (2005), Intervention by Stavros Dimas, Commissioner for Environment 
European Commission at the 13th Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development, 
High Level Panel discussion, New York, 20 April, URL= http://www.europa-eu-
un.org/articles/sk/article_4619_sk.htm [20/10/06].  
 
Dodds, Felix (2000), “Reforming the International Institutions”, in: Felix Dodds (ed.), Earth 
Summit 2002: A New Deal, London: Earthscan, pp. 291-314. 
 
ECOFIN Council (2002), Council Conclusions, 2432
nd
 Council meeting, Luxembourg, 4 
June.  
 
Ecologic Round Table (2004), "UNEP – Establishing Universal Membership", Summary of 
the Chairman, 2-3 February, Cecilienhof, Potsdam, Germany, URL= 
http://www.ecologic.de/download/projekte/1800-1849/1810/1810_Summary.PDF [18/10/06]. 
 
ENB (1994), Summary of the Second Session of the Commission on Sustainable 
Development, 16-27 May, URL= http://www.iisd.ca/vol05/0525078e.html [17/10/06]. 
 
ENB (1994), UN General Assembly Highlights, 19-21 October, URL= 
http://www.iisd.ca/vol03/0305002e.html [17/10/06]. 
 
ENB (1997), Summary of the Nineteenth United Nations General Assembly Special Session 
to Review Implementation of Agenda 21, 23-27 June, URL= 
http://www.iisd.ca/vol05/0588010e.html [17/10/06]. 
 
ENB (1998), The Sixth Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development, 20 April – 1 
May. 
 29 
 
ENB (2001a), Summary of the 21
st
 Session of the UNEP Governing Council and Second 
Global Ministerial Environment Forum, 5-9 February. 
 
ENB (2001b), Summary of the Second Session of the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Group of 
Experts on Energy and Sustainable Development, 26 February – 2 March. 
 
ENB (2001c), Summary of Ninth Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development, 
16-28 April. 
 
ENB (2001d), Summary of the Second Meeting of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Group 
of Ministers or Their Representatives on International Environmental Governance, 17 July. 
 
ENB (2001e), Summary of the Fourth Meeting of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Group 
of Ministers or Their Representatives on International Environmental Governance, 30 
November – 1 December. 
 
ENB (2002), Summary of the Seventh Special Session of the UNEP Governing Council, 
Third Global Ministerial Environment Forum and Final Open-Ended Intergovernmental 
Group of Ministers or Their Representatives on International Environmental Governance, 12 
– 15 February. 
 
ENB (2003), Summary of the Eleventh Session of the Commission on Sustainable 
Development, 28 April - 9 May. 
 
ENB (2005), Summary of the Thirteenth Session of the Commission on Sustainable 
Development, 11-22 April. 
 
ENB (2006), Summary of the International Conference on Chemicals Management and Ninth 
Session of the UNEP Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum, 4-9 
February. 
 
Environment Council (2000), Council Conclusions, 2321
st
 Council meeting, 18-19 December. 
 
Environment Council (2001), Council Conclusions, 2355
th
 Council meeting, 7 June. 
 
Environment Management Group (EMG) (2006), URL= http://www.unemg.org/about.php 
[15/10/06] 
 
EU Presidency Statement (2000), Statement by Mrs Catherine GRAS, Financial Adviser at 
the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, 18 October, New York, URL=  
http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_192_en.htm [19/10/06]. 
 
EU Presidency Statement (2001a), Statement by Mr. Jean-Paul Charlier, Representative of 
Belgium, on behalf of the European Union, 25 July, URL= http://www.europa-eu-
un.org/articles/en/article_187_en.htm [19/10/06]. 
 
EU Presidency Statement (2001b), Meeting of UNEP Open-Ended Group of Ministers on 
International Environmental Governance, Statement by Mr. Kjell Larsson, Swedish Minister 
for the Environment on behalf of the European Union, 18 April, New York, URL= 
http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_315_en.htm [19/10/06]. 
 30 
 
European Commission (2003), The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of 
multilateralism, COM(2003) 526 final. 
 
European Council (2005), Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 16-17 June. 
 
EU Speaking Points (2006a), Informals of the General Assembly on Environmental Reform, 
Statement by Ambassador Gerhard Pfanzelter, Permanent Representative of Austria to the 
United Nations, on behalf of the European Union, 19 April, New York, URL= 
http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_5936_en.htm [19/10/06]. 
 
EU Speaking Points (2006b), Informal Meeting of the General Assembly on Environmental 
Reform, Statement by Counsellor Alice Zaunschirm, Austrian Mission to the United Nations, 
on behalf of the European Union, 13 June, New York, URL= http://www.europa-eu-
un.org/articles/en/article_6052_en.htm [19/10/06]. 
 
France-Diplomatie (2006), "Transformer le PNUE en agence spécialisée", URL= 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/actions-france_830/onu-
organisationsinternationales_1032/institutions-specialisees-onu_3187/onue-
environnement_4347/ [15/10/06]. 
 
Hyvarinen, Joy and Duncan Brack (2000), Global Environmental Institutions: analysis and 
options for change, Report prepared for the Department of the Environment, Transport and 
the Regions (UK), London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
 
Imber, Mark (1993), “Too many cooks? The post-Rio reform of the United Nations”, 
International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 1, pp. 55-70. 
 
Jordan, Andrew and Heather Voisey (1998), "The 'Rio Process': The Politics and Substantive 
Outcomes of 'Earth Summit II'", Global Environmental Change, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 93-97. 
 
Lenzerini, Federico (2006), "The Reform of Environmental Governance in the United 
Nations: the French Proposal", in: The Future of Environmental Law: International and 
European Perspectives, European University Institute (EUI) Working Papers Law No. 
2006/01, pp. 12- 14. 
 
Lightfoot, Simon and Jon Burchell (2004), “Green hope or greenwash? The actions of the 
European Union at the World Summit on sustainable development, Global Environmental 
Change, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 337-344. 
 
Lightfoot, Simon and Jon Burchell (2005), “The European Union and the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development: Normative Power Europe in Action?”, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 75-95. 
 
Marsh, Duncan R. (2005), “Friends and Foes: industrialised countries in multilateral 
environmental negotiations”, in: Angela C. Kallhauge, Gunnar Sjöstedt, Elisabeth Corell, 
Global Challenges: Furthering the Multilateral Process for Sustainable Development, 
Sheffield: Greenleaf, pp. 144-170. 
 
Mensah, Chris (1996), “The United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development”, in: 
Jacob Werksman (ed.), Greening International Institutions, London: Earthscan, pp. 21-37. 
 31 
 
Morgera, Elisa (2006), "The 2005 World Summit: UN Reforms and the Protection of the 
Environment", in: The Future of Environmental Law: International and European 
Perspectives, European University Institute (EUI) Working Papers Law No. 2006/01, pp. 15-
20. 
 
Morgera, Elisa and Marin Duran (2006), "The 2005 UN World Summit, the Environment and 
the Role of the EU: Priorities, Promises, and Prospects", RECIEL, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 11-22. 
 
Najam, Adil (2003), “The Case Against a New International Environmental Organization”, 
Global Governance, Vol. 9, pp. 367-384. 
 
Opoku, Camilla and Andrew Jordan (2005), “The European Union and the External 
Dimension of Sustainable Development: Ambitious Promises but Uncertain Outcomes”, 
Paper prepared for the 2005 Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions on Global 
Environmental Change “International Organisations and Global Environmental Governance”, 
Potsdam, 2-3 December.  
 
Rhinard, Mark and Michael Kaeding (2005), “The International Bargaining Power of the 
European Union in ‘Mixed’ Competence Negotiations: The Case of the 2000 Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety”, Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) 
Conference 31 March – 2 April, Austin, Texas, United States. 
 
Sjöstedt, Gunnar, Lisa van Well, and Angela C. Kallhauge (2005), “An evolving sustainable 
development regime”, in: Angela C. Kallhauge, Gunnar Sjöstedt, Elisabeth Corell, Global 
Challenges: Furthering the Multilateral Process for Sustainable Development, Sheffield: 
Greenleaf, pp. 294-304. 
 
Solbes, Pedro (2001), Pedro Solbes comments on "Sustainable Development" at the OECD 
Ministerial meeting in Paris, 17 May, URL= http://www.europa-eu-
un.org/articles/en/article_128_en.htm [20/10/06]. 
 
Swedish EU Discussion Paper (2001), “International Governance for Sustainable 
Development”, December 2001, URL= 
http://www.anped.org/PDF/WSSD%20EU%20papers.pdf [06/10/2006]. 
 
Timoshenko, Alexander and Mark Berman (1996), “The United Nations Environment 
Programme and the United Nations Development Programme”, in: Jacob Werksman (ed.), 
Greening International Institutions, London: Earthscan, pp. 38-54. 
 
UK Note on the World Summit on Sustainable Development (2001), October 2001, URL= 
http://www.anped.org/PDF/WSSD%20EU%20papers.pdf [06/10/2006]. 
 
Vogler, John (1999), “The European Union as an Actor in International Environmental 
Politics”, Environmental Politics, 8 (3), Autumn, pp.24-48. 
 
Vogler, John (2003), "The external environmental policy of the European Union", in: Olav 
Schram Stokke and Øystein B. Thommessen (eds.), Yearbook of International Cooperation 
on Environment and Development 2003/4, London: Fridtjof Nansen Institute/Earthscan, pp. 
65–71. 
 
 32 
Vogler, John (2005) “The European contribution to global environmental governance” 
International Affairs, 81 (4), July, pp. 835-849. 
 
Von Frantzius, Ina (2004), “World Summit on Sustainable Development Johannesburg 2002: 
A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Outcomes”, Environmental Politics, Vol. 13, No. 
2, pp. 467-473. 
 
Wagner, Lynn M. (1999), “Negotiations in the UN Commission on Sustainable Development: 
Coalitions, Processes and Outcomes”, International Negotiation, Vol. 4, pp. 107-131. 
 
Wagner, Lynn M. (2005), “A commission will lead them? The UN commission on sustainable 
development and UNCED follow-up”, in: Angela C. Kallhauge, Gunnar Sjöstedt and 
Elisabeth Corell (eds.), Global Challenges: Furthering the Multilateral Process for 
Sustainable Development, Sheffield: Greenleaf, pp. 103-122. 
 
Wallström, Margot (2002a), "A Wake-Up Call for Global Sustainability", Speech at the 
European Policy Centre Dialogue: Sustainability and Globalisation – Towards Johannesburg, 
26 February, URL= http://www.europaworld.org/issue71/awakeupcall1302.htm [08/10/06]. 
 
Wallström, Margot (2002b), "Conclusions of World Summit on sustainable development in 
Johannesburg", Environment Commissioner, European Parliament, Strasbourg 25 September, 
URL= http://www.europaworld.org/week98/speechwalstrom27902.htm [08/10/06]. 
 
Wallström (2003), "Implementing the WSSD Outcomes", Environment Commissioner, 
European Parliament, Sustainable Development Inter-Group, 24 September, Strasbourg, 
URL= http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_2781_en.htm [19/10/06]. 
 
Zito, Anthony R. (2005), “The European Union as an Environmental Leader in a Global    
Environment”, Globalizations, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 363-375. 
